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Abstract
High parental income, while undeniably causing benefits for a child in terms of better
access to education and more favorable labor market outcomes, may at the same time increase
a child’s income aspirations and thereby reduce financial satisfaction, ceteris paribus. In this
paper, we investigate the relationship between financial satisfaction and parental income with
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The results indicate that there is indeed a
negative well-being externality of parental income, and that children appear to compare their
actual income situation with the aspiration level acquired while growing up.
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1 Introduction
Most people would agree that parents who work hard and earn a high income do something
good for their children. They can choose to live in a good neighborhood, afford to put their
children in better schools, buy books and support them in many other ways. Indeed, there is
a large literature showing that parental income is a strong correlate of educational attainment
(Taubman, 1989 Chevalier et al., 2005, Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). Similarly, there is ample
evidence for a high correlation in income and earnings across generations (e.g., Behrman and
Taubman 1990, Peters 1992, Solon 1992, Zimmermann 1992).
While we do not question the beneficial effect of parental income per se, we explore in this
paper the empirical relevance of a potential downside, or “hidden cost”, of high parental income
on the well-being of children. The argument is as follows. A person’s subjective well-being, as
reflected in satisfaction with life in general, and satisfaction with income as part of it, depends
on the individual aspiration level. We conjecture that income aspirations depend strongly on the
material situation that prevailed in the family during one’s upbringing. In other words, a higher
parental income leads to higher income aspiration levels of the children that, if unfulfilled, may
cause unhappiness. Hence, if parents take a broader interest in the well-being of their children,
they should be mindful of the negative well-being externality that a very high income – and
standard of living – may generate.
Of course, the basic idea described above is not new at all, and the transfer of aspirations for
standards of living from parents to children has implicitly or explicitly played a role in many areas
of social science research. For example, it lies at the heart of the Easterlin hypothesis (Easterlin,
1987) where it is used to explain the fertility decline in modern Western societies. In the happiness
literature, there have been several studies on income norms and aspirations (Stutzer, 2004, Clark
and Oswald, 1996), but to the best of our knowledge, only one paper addresses specifically the
comparison with and adaptation to perceived living standards of parents. The empirical analysis
in McBride (2001) determines the well-being effects of an individual’s subjective comparison of
living standards, based on the question: “Compared to your parents when they were the age you
are now, do you think your own standard of living now is: much better, somewhat better, about
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the same, somewhat worse, or much worse?”.
Using data from the General Social Survey, he finds that as the current standard of living
becomes worse relative to the parents’ standard of living, for a given amount of own income, the
subjective well-being of respondents decreases. This effect is both statistically and economically
significant. A move from ”much worse” to ”much better” decreases the probability of being
“unhappy” by more than ten percentage points.
In contrast to McBride (2001) we model the income norm directly, using data from a large
household survey – the German Socio-Economic Panel. We also focus on financial satisfaction
rather than on general life satisfaction. The data allow us to relate the financial satisfaction of
adult children, who have moved out of the parental household and live now independently, to their
own income and to the income of their parents. We account for potential specification problems,
such as endogeneity of the parental income variable and individual traits. The results suggest
the presence of an externality. In particular, we find that higher parental income significantly
decreases the children’s financial satisfaction, for a given own income, and that these estimates
are robust against various model specifications.
2 Empirical Models of Well-Being Adaptation
While traditional economic theory predicts that individual utility depends on absolute income,
research based on self-reported well-being challenges this view. For instance, a positive relation
between well-being and income, although present in the cross-section, could not be identified over
time: Despite the substantial economic growth people have not become more satisfied in the
long run (Easterlin 2001). This and other puzzles call for more flexible concepts that are able to
explain these findings. Diener (2002) provides an overview of the different approaches taken.
An important strand of the literature, and the one our paper will contribute to, follows social
comparison theory, which claims that the impact of income on well-being is determined by change-
able standards stemming from aspirations, habituation levels, and social comparison (Diener and
Diener 1984). However, the determination of the relevant others to which an individual compares
himself to remains an open issue. Clark and Oswald (1996) propose a model in which workers com-
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pare their wage to a wage rate obtained from a conventional earnings equation. Stutzer (2004)
considers community income levels as determinants of income aspirations. Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2005) defines over 50 different reference groups based on age, education and geographical region.
They all find significant negative effects of comparison levels on satisfaction.
As in McBride (2001), the focus here is on “internal” or “psychological” norms stemming from
a comparison with past personal experience, and hence psychological adaptation effects related
to past standards of living. We refer to this effect as inter-generational adaptation. If we measure
the parents standard of living by their income (current or average), the empirical model we have
in mind can be written as
FSit = f(own incomeit, parental incomei, xit, uit) (1)
where FSit, financial satisfaction of individual i in period t, is modelled as a function of
own income, parental income, other control variables x that include individual and household
socio-economic characteristics, such as age, gender, health status, household size, etc, as well as
unobserved factors u.
The timing of the parental income variable is not clear. One might expect that it is not
current parental income that matters most, but rather past parental income, for example the
average income available during childhood and adolescence. Unfortunately, this information is
not available in the data, and thus we use parental income in t, keeping in mind that this is only
an imperfect proxy for past living standards.
In this framework, we expect that
∂FSit
∂own incomeit
> 0
A negative externality is present if financial satisfaction depends negatively on parental income,
ceteris paribus, i.e., keeping own income and other factors fixed:
∂FSit
∂parental incomei
< 0
For practical purposes, we consider a linearized version of Model (1)
FSit = β0 + β1 own incomeit + β2 parental incomeit + γxit + uit (2)
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To actually estimate the parameters of the model, we face two minor, more technical issues,
namely how to address the panel structure and the fact that the dependent variable is ordinal,
and a major, substantive one, namely the possible endogeneity of parental income.
The data we will be using are panel data. In other words, there will be repeated measurements
on financial satisfaction as well as own and parental income for the same person over time. In
many situations, one would want to control for individual specific time-invariant heterogeneity
that may be correlated with a regressor of interest. In this case, however, such within-estimation
is not very meaningful, because β2 then implicitly represents the short-term effect of period-
to-period variations of parental income on children’s financial satisfaction. But adaptation and
adjustment of income norms is inherently a slow process and we would not expect to find any
effect in the fixed effects within model. Thus, we report pooled OLS estimates (where standard
errors are corrected for clustering at the individual level) as well as between estimates, averaging
all individual observations over the available time periods.
We could use ordered probit models but previous research (e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters,
2004, Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004) has shown that it makes little practical difference,
and linear models have the advantage of a simple interpretation of coefficients.
We now come to the substantive issue of potential bias in β2 due to omitted variables. One
way to think of this problems is to notice that wealth, both own wealth and parents’ wealth has
not been included in model (1). Although the satisfaction question used in the empirical analysis
of this paper explicitly refers to income (“How satisfied are you with your household income at
present?”) it seems reasonable to assume that this question cannot be answered by the respondent
without taking wealth into consideration. Thus, an extended model can be written as
FSit = β0 + β1 own incomeit + β2 parental incomeit
+β3 own wealthit + β4 parental wealthit + γxit + uit
where, according to an extended adaptation hypothesis, β3 > 0 and β4 < 0. Unfortunately, there
is practically no useful information on wealth in the data. One could interpret house ownership
as an indicator of wealth. However, since information on mortgages is missing, even that simple
indicator will be quite uninformative.
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Omitting wealth from the estimating equation likely leads to a biased estimation of the income
adaptation parameter β2. The reason is that higher parental income is typically associated with
higher wealth of parents. Higher wealth of parents, in turn, can have a direct impact on the
children’s financial satisfaction for a number of reasons. Financial satisfaction goes up if parents
share some of their wealth with their children. The same positive effect can occur if there is no
current sharing but children expect a future transfer. Finally, a higher parental wealth might be
an additional indicator for standards of living norms, thereby reducing financial satisfaction. We
do not worry about the last effect but about the first two. Since we cannot disentangle them,
we need to control for parental wealth, and we suggest doing this by controlling for financial
satisfaction of parents. The model then becomes
FSit = β0 + β1 own incomeit + β2 parental incomeit + β3 parents′ FSit + γxit + uit (3)
A higher financial satisfaction of parents indicates, for a given parental income, a greater wealth
of parents. Of course, the parents financial satisfaction potentially captures some other effects
as well. For example, there may be altruism at play. In this case, a child’s FS increases directly
in response to parents’ FS. It is not clear, how meaningful it is to define altruism in terms of
interdependent financial satisfaction, rather than general life satisfaction, as in Schwarze and
Winkelmann (2006), but there is no need to rule out the possibility a-priori. In addition, the FS
response may be affected by personality traits that are partially inherited. This would generate a
positive correlation between parents FS and child FS. As a consequence, the coefficient β3 in (3)
has no interesting interpretation by itself.
This is not a real problem, however, since we want to learn about β2, and the parents’ FS is
only included to avoid bias due to wealth effects. This objective will be achieved by estimating
model (3), provided it is the case that a child’s wealth does not depend on parental income
once we control for parents’ wealth, here proxied by way of parental FS. The adaptation effect
is then identified by differences in standard of living stemming from income, rather than wealth
differences.
Finally, there is a further potential bias when estimating (3), resulting from unobserved trans-
fers between parents and children. In this case, a higher parental income may have a positive effect
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on FS, since children will then be more likely to receive a transfer from their parents. However,
household income in the data is defined as including all public and private transfers. Thus, direct
monetary transfers should show up in the own income variable, and therefore be accounted for.
This leaves the possibility of in-kind transfers, or expectations of future transfers that are positive
functions of parents’ income. While we cannot address such a modified transfer argument directly,
it should work, if it is relevant, in a direction opposite to adaptation. A negative coefficient on
parental income would then provide a lower bound (in absolute value) for the true adaptation
effect.
3 Data and Results
The dataset used in this study is drawn from five waves (2000 to 2004) of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a representative annual panel survey of private house-
holds in Germany and includes a wide range of socio-economic and demographic characteristics
on all household members (see Burkhauser et al. 2001 for details).
The key strength of this data set is that it provides information on extended families. In our
case, the relevant extended family consists of a child household and a parent household. In many
instances, the full survey instrument is applied to both households, and this information can then
be linked.
As the GSOEP initially consisted of a random sample of households in West Germany, there
was practically no chance that two such linked households would be observed in the data, and
even in that extremely unlikely case, one would not know about it. However, over time, the
sample was extended to include households of all those persons, who were at first part of one of
the original households but later moved out to form a separate, independent household. Such
new households could result from divorce or separation or, more important for our analysis, from
a child growing up and moving out.
Clearly, following up on these children requires both information on the location of the new
household, as well as their willingness to participate, two conditions that were met in many but
certainly not all of the cases. The number of such linkable parent-child observations was very
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low initially (the GSOEP was started in 1984) but has increased over recent years. In 2000,
for example, there were 1,118 parent households that could be matched to at least one child
household. Extracting such data for the period 2000-2004, and considering pairs with complete
parent households (with mother and father present), we obtain a total of 4697 observations for
1434 different children.
The observational unit is the child, for which we observe, among other things, own financial
satisfaction (the response to the question “How satisfied are you with your income at present?”
given on an eleven-point scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means
“completely satisfied”), own income, parental financial satisfaction (taken as the average of both
parents’ responses) and the parental household income. Further controls include a health indica-
tor, age, education, gender, employment and marital status, as well as the year of observation.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
Descriptive statistics for selected variables, for parents and children, are reported in Table 1.
The average financial satisfaction, on the 0-10 scale, is 6.1, equal for both parents and children.
This is despite the fact that parents have an income that is on average about 17 percent higher
than that of children. The age difference is on average 27 years, which is thus the average age of
the parents at the time of birth of these children. Cohort and life-cycle effects are also reflected
in the house ownership rates and in education levels: while parents have substantially higher
ownership rates, their education levels (measure in years of schooling) trails that of their children
by more than a year. All these differences are statistically significant.
In order to test the hypothesis that financial satisfaction is negatively affected by parents’
income, due to adaptation that leads to increased income aspiration levels, we report results from
a number of alternative regressions using the aforementioned sample of 4697 pooled observations.
The results of these regressions are shown in Table 2, where we report coefficients on the key
variables of interest, together with their standard errors. The full results including the controls
(that are identical in all models) are available on request.
— Insert Table 2 about here —
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Without controlling for parental wealth by way of their financial satisfaction, log parental
income has a positive, though statistically insignificant effect, on child FS (see the column labelled
(1)). The own income effect is positive and large. A unit increase in log own income is predicted
to increase financial satisfaction by 1.9 points on the eleven points scale. After we control for
parental FS, in the column labelled (2), the parental income parameter switches its sign and
becomes statistically significant and we therefore find indeed evidence for adaptation – and thus
for a negative externality of parental income.
As one might expect, the effect is not particularly large, but it is not negligible either. Com-
paring own and parental income effects, we find that a ceteris paribus increase in parental income
by ten percent lowers financial satisfaction by roughly the equivalent of a two percent reduction in
own income. As we mentioned earlier this is a lower bound of the effect if there is some additional
bias due to unobserved transfers.
The next columns corroborate the main conclusion. In column (3), we show rsults for a model
with log-income ranks rather than levels. This specification reduces the sensitivity to potential
outliers, i.e., a few very large incomes, that might have a disproportionate effect on the OLS
results. In this case, the question is how the financial satisfaction depends on the position in
the income distribution occupied by parents, keeping the own distributional position fixed. We
find that this does not really make any difference. The coefficients are about half as large, a
consequence of the different scaling. In relative terms, however, things stay the same. A ten
percent increase in parental income rank is predicted to lower financial satisfaction by about the
same amount as a two percent reduction in own income rank.
The next column shows a discretized version of the adaptation model. It includes an indicator
variable that is one if the parental income exceeds the own income, and zero else. Individuals,
whose own income (in household equivalence terms) falls short of that of their parents report a
substantially lower financial satisfaction, for a constant own income, than those individuals whose
income exceeds that of their parents. The point estimate is a 0.412 loss in financial satisfaction
for the former group, clearly a large effect.
Finally, we investigate whether the effect is asymmetric: individuals may loose more from
falling short of the income norm (i.e., having a smaller income than their parents), than they
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gain from exceeding the norm (for a similar approach see Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005). Formally, we
estimate a spline function that allows the slope of the relationship between parental income and
financial satisfaction to differ below and above the own income point. And indeed, the results show
that there is a significant difference in slopes: the effect of parental income is significantly greater
(in absolute value) if the parental income is higher than own income. Or to put it differently, the
loss of financial satisfaction implied by an increased income norm is larger if the own income is
below the norm than above.
4 Further sensitivity checks
In order to explore the extent to which the effect of income norms as a determinant of financial
satisfaction might depend on the particular specification, we performed some sensitivity analyses.
First, we considered a model where the estimation is based on individual level means rather than
pooled data. Using individual means has the disadvantage that effects tend to be estimated less
precisely. The main advantage is, however, that measurement error in the parental income proxy
for the standard of living norm is reduced. Under the classical measurement error assumptions
this would reduce attenuation bias, and thus lead to larger (in absolute value) adaptation effects.
The results in Table 3 show that this is the case indeed. While the coefficients of the own income
variable are very similar to those of the pooled model shown in Table 2, the parental income effects
are now around 30 percent larger. This evidence thus certainly supports the previous conclusion
that income norms acquired through parents play a role in determining financial satisfaction.
— Insert Table 3 about here —
The German re-unification in 1990 provides an interesting “natural experiment” for all sorts
of questions in social science research, and questions related to hedonic adaptation may count
among them. Presumably, the income distribution was very compressed in pre-unification Eastern
Germany (Biewen 2000). The children in our East German sample are on average in their thirties
at the time of the interviews in 2000-2004. Thus they were born and spent most, if not all, of
their childhood years before re-unification in East Germany. One might hypothesize that income
aspirations for this group were completely different than that of their otherwise comparable West
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German peers. In particular, the current income of their parents in 2000-2004 should be only
a very poor indicator of their true experiences during childhood. The resulting adaptation and
increase in aspiration levels for those whose parents have higher incomes (now) may not be relevant
at all, or measurement error may bias the coefficients towards zero for that group. Also, as the
unification “shock” raised the incomes of all by a substantial amount, one would expect financial
satisfaction to be higher among East Germans, for a given income, than for West Germans.
— Insert Table 4 about here —
It turns out that none of these predictions is supported by the data. For example, a regression
of financial satisfaction on current income and a “West” indicator yields a significant positive
effect for “West”, not a negative one. Also, from Table 4, we see that income adaptation across
generations is evident for both subsamples, the West German as well as the East German one. The
own income effects tend to be larger in East Germany (a similar result for life satisfaction found
also by Frijters, Haskin-DeNew and Shields 2004), as are the parents’ income effects (though not
in relative terms). One possible explanation is that by the time of our sample period, people had
already lived for at least ten years in unified Germany, and children may have adopted the living
standards of their parents during that period as an inner norm. Another explanation would be
that the Eastern pre-unification income distribution was not so equal after all, and that there is a
high correlation between pre-and post-unification income ranks. We are not aware of any direct
evidence along those lines. Clearly, the East-West German comparison should be scrutinized more
intensively. Here, we conclude that income adaptation, as defined in our set-up, appears to be
present in both (former) East and West Germany.
Finally, it is relevant to understand how this result for financial satisfaction translates to
general life-satisfaction. In the usual view, life satisfaction is an aggregation of various domain
satisfactions, life satisfaction being one among them. If the financial domain is the only domain
affected by parental income, then it should be the case that the effect of parental income on
life satisfaction is simply the product of its effect on financial satisfaction times the weight that
financial satisfaction has in determining life satisfaction. It should be the case then that a higher
parental income reduces life satisfaction ceteris paribus, for a given own income. However, it is
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also possible that parental income affects life satisfaction through other domains, such as health
or education. In this case, the overall effect is less clear.
The last two columns of Table 5 show the pooled and between results with life satisfaction
as dependent variable. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no evidence for adaptation here. All the
estimated parental income effects are insignificant. A possible interpretation, consistent with the
remarks above, is that the financial domain effect of adaptation is “undone” by indirect effects
of parental income (or correlates thereof) in other domains. It would be worthwhile to further
pursue this issue in future research.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines a potential downside, or “hidden cost”, of high parental income on the
financial satisfaction of children. We hypothesize that the availability of material resources while
growing up is an important determinant of the level of income aspirations, and parental income
serves as a proxy for these material resources. When compared to the actual own income situation,
such unfulfilled expectations may cause financial dissatisfaction of the child.
We tested our hypothesis using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 2000 to 2004.
The results confirm, by and large, those of McBride (2001). This was not necessarily to be
expected as we use a different data set for a different country and period of time, a different
dependent variable (financial satisfaction rather than subjective well-being) and a different mea-
sure for the internal income norm (direct income information for parents rather than a subjective
comparison by the child).
The negative externality of parental income on the well-being of children implies, for example,
that own income must increase by about a quarter of a percent to compensate (in terms of
constant financial satisfaction) for each percent increase in parental income. Our results are
robust to various model specification changes, OLS versus between estimation, using ranks rather
than levels, or splitting the sample into West and East German observations.
Since we focus on income only, our study can not say anything on the transmission of standard
of living norms through parental wealth. Presumably, this is an important channel as well and
11
thus the overall aspiration effect is possibly underestimated by our numbers. Finally, the results do
not imply that parents shouldn’t try to provide their children with the best possible, nourishing
environment to grow up in. However, a focus on material aspects may be less beneficial than
investing in the stimulation of artistic, intellectual and social development (all areas in which
such adaptation effects are presumably less pronounced).
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Table 1: Sample Means of Selected Variables (N=4697)
Children Parents
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err.
Log household income 8.164 0.008 8.331 0.006
Log Household size 0.763 0.007 0.868 0.004
Financial satisfaction 6.078 0.031 6.076 0.028
Age 30.25 0.083 57.42 0.114
Years of schooling 12.46 0.036 11.20 0.031
House ownership 0.258 0.006 0.571 0.007
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Table 2: Regression results for adaptation to parental income
Dependent Variable: Financial Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log own income 1.905∗∗ 1.887∗∗ 1.647∗∗ 1.800∗∗
(0.106) (0.103) (0.110) (0.112)
Log parental income 0.094 -0.331∗∗ -0.208∗
(0.089) (0.093) (0.112)
Log rank own income 0.785∗∗
(0.050)
Log rank parental income -0.177∗∗
(0.045)
Parents’ income higher -0.413∗∗
(0.080)
(Log par. inc. − Log own inc.) -0.305∗∗
×(par. inc. higher) (0.145)
Parent’s fin. sat. 0.222∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.222∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Notes:
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel 2000-2004. n=4697
Standard errors in parentheses; Significance levels: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%;
The dependent variable is the respondents’ financial satisfaction coded from 0 to 10. The
pooled models have been estimated by ordinary least squares, and the standard errors are
adjusted for clustering. All models include controls for household size, health, age, education,
gender, employment and marital status, house ownership and the data wave.
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Table 3: Regression results using individual means
Dependent Variable: Financial Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log own income 1.872∗∗ 1.856∗∗ 1.562∗∗ 1.730∗∗
(0.122) (0.117) (0.133) (0.126)
Log parental income 0.106 -0.471∗∗ -0.287∗∗
(0.099) (0.110) (0.129)
Log rank own income 0.738∗∗
(0.053)
Log rank parental income -0.232∗∗
(0.055)
Parents’ income higher -0.535∗∗
(0.125)
(Log par. inc. − Log own inc.) -0.543∗∗
×(par. inc. higher) (0.198)
Parent’s fin. sat. 0.285∗∗ 0.285∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.286∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.027)
Notes: see Table 2; n = 1434.
.
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Table 4: Further sensitivity checks
Financial Satisfaction Life Satisfaction
East Germany West Germany
OLS Between OLS Between OLS Between
Log own income 2.205 2.140 1.566 1.566 0.420 0.367
(0.172) (0.227) (0.173) (0.193) (0.068) (0.083)
Log parental income -0.201 -0.509 -0.250 -0.288 0.070 0.008
(0.179) (0.236) (0.140) (0.166) (0.063) (0.071)
Parent’s fin. sat. 0.188 0.267 0.184 0.208 0.137 0.172
(0.042) (0.052) (0.038) (0.047) (0.021) (0.022)
Observations 1297 381 2143 595 4722 1440
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